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Sammendrag 
Når forfremmelser i arbeidslivet gis til de mest produktive karriere arbeiderne innebærer dette at 
arbeidsinnsatsen til karriere arbeidere sammenliknes. Karriere arbeiderne deltar på denne måten i en 
konkurranse som gir incentiver til å jobbe hardere enn sine kolleger. Slike konkurranser kan medføre 
at arbeidsinnsatsen blir så høy at den innebærer et effektivitetstap for samfunnet. Denne studien 
analyserer hvordan optimal skattepolitikk bør tilpasses når slike effektivitetstap forekommer. Studien 
viser at en toppskatt som reduserer gevinsten ved å delta i rivalisering om forfremmelser øker 
velferden når skattebyrden på karrierearbeidere overgår skattebyrden på ikke-karrierearbeidere. En 
toppskatt vil også innebære en jevnere fordeling, siden bedrifter responderer ved å redusere 
lønnspremien forbundet med forfremmelser. Den lavere lønnspremien bidrar til å redusere 
effektivitetstapet forbundet med for høy arbeidsinnsats per karrierearbeider. Antall karrierearbeidere 
øker imidlertid, og dette demper velferdsgevinsten. I tilfeller der skattebyrden for karrierearbeidere er 
lik skattebyrden for ikke-karrierearbeidere vil slik beskatning ikke bidra til å øke velferden. Årsaken er 
at velferdsgevinsten forbundet med redusert arbeidstid per karrierearbeider blir nøytralisert av 
velferdstapet forbundet med at antall karrierearbeidere øker. Dette resultatet avviker fra resultatet i 
Persson og Sandmo (2005), og Meyer og Mookherjee (1987) som finner at fordelingen bare kan 
forbedres på bekostning av effektivitet. En proporsjonal inntektsskatt vil øke velferden hvis slik 
beskatning øker skattekilen mellom karrierearbeidere og ikke-karrierearbeidere. Hvis denne 
skattekilen ikke økes av proporsjonal beskatning vil heller ikke velferden øke. Studien finner også at 
lover og regler som begrenser arbeidsinnsatsen til karrierearbeidere bidrar til å øke velferden. Dette 
resultatet krever imidlertid at skattebyrden på karrierearbeidere overstiger skattebyrden på ikke-
karrierearbeidere. Dette resultatet støtter konklusjonen i Landers mfl. (1996). 
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1. Introduction  
Long-term trends show that an increasing share of the population are employed in high-skilled 
occupations where career opportunities are common. The trends also show that wage differences are 
increasing in many countries, and that the increase in top incomes is substantial; see Piketty and Saez 
(2006) and Atkinson et al. (2011). Empirical observations of payment schemes within firms show that 
wage levels is linked to career ladders within internal hierarchies; see Baker et al. 1994a and 1994b. 
Workers’ wages are partly determined by job level, where top positions are rewarded with substantial 
wages. These trends are consistent with literature on tournaments and promotions; see Malcomson 
(1984), Bognanno (2001) and DeVaro (2006). The theoretical literature on promotions and 
tournaments mainly concerns how rules and contracts should be designed to stimulate effort and to 
allocate the right type of workers to the right tasks; see e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Fairburn and 
Malcomson (2001). Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that rank-order tournaments lead to a socially 
optimal allocation of effort when workers are risk neutral. Persson and Sandmo (2005) study welfare-
maximizing taxation within the simple framework of Lazear and Rosen (1981), and find that zero 
taxation maximizes the welfare when society is only concerned with equal opportunities. A tax would 
distort the effort of identical and risk-neutral individuals, and hence reduce expected utility. A non-
zero redistributive tax is optimal if society’s welfare function displays inequality aversion in ex-post 
outcomes. This conflict between efficiency and equity is also demonstrated by Meyer and Mookherjee 
(1987). Empirical evidence, however, suggests that career workers aiming for promotion work 
inefficiently long hours compared to a socially efficient level; see Landers et al. (1996), who also 
argue that a maximum hour law generates a Pareto improvement. In their study, the income sharing of 
partners in a law firm creates an incentive to promote associates who have a propensity to work very 
hard. Associates have to work inefficiently long hours to separate themselves from potential free riders 
in a game of adverse selection. A maximum hour law generates a Pareto improvement within this 
setting. Another source of inefficiency arises as a result of rivalry among workers to win a promotion 
race; see Frank and Cook, (1995). Sandmo (1994) concludes that “a study of tax effects on labour 
effort in the particular context of promotions must explicit account of the interaction between 
individuals. It cannot be analyzed properly, as in the standard labour supply framework, by means of a 
representative worker”.   
 
The literature has neglected studying how policy should be designed when firms avoid regulations and 
taxation by adjusting the number of career workers competing for promotions. A policy aimed at 
lowering the inefficiently long hours of career workers may also improve working conditions, and 
hence incentives to become a career worker. Thus, such a policy may lead to an increase in the number 
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of career workers working inefficiently long hours. Lander’s recommendation of imposing laws and 
regulations aimed at restricting excess effort of career workers may induce firms to hire more career 
workers. Hence, the social loss may increase as the number of career workers working inefficiently 
long hours may increase. The Persson and Sandmo recommendation of introducing an income tax 
designed to lower the wage premium of career workers seems to be desirable as both efficiency and 
ex-post redistribution may improve. Firms, however, may attempt to avoid the tax by awarding 
smaller wage premiums to several career workers. This may increase incentives to become a career 
worker, and hence lead to an increase in the number of career workers working inefficiently long 
hours. The aim of the current study is to analyse how policy should be designed in a market solution 
that considers both inefficiencies in the number of hours worked and the number of workers choosing 
a career job. The study focuses on how policy should be designed to combat excess effort of career 
workers. The study is not concerned with shirking due to asymmetric information that leads to lack of 
effort.   
 
This study shows that the welfare effects of public policies depend on whether the government is able 
to levy a higher tax burden on career workers than on non-career workers. The government is not 
likely to implement policies that differentiate between career workers and non-career workers. A tax 
wedge between career workers and non-career workers is, however, generated by both proportional 
and progressive taxation when career workers earn more than non-career workers. The study shows 
that both a tax on top income aimed at lowering the rewards of a promotion and a maximum hour law 
that restricts excess effort increase welfare when the tax burden on career workers exceeds the tax 
burden on non-career workers. The tax burden prevents the welfare gain of reducing excess effort per 
worker from being neutralized by the welfare cost connected to an increase in the number of career 
workers. The inequality in ex-post outcomes is also reduced by the tax policy. Hence, in contrast to the 
conclusions in Persson and Sandmo (2005) and Meyer and Mookherjee (1987), there is no conflict 
between ex-post equity and efficiency.   
 
A tax on top incomes does not improve welfare when the tax burden on career workers equals the tax 
burden on non-career workers. Efficiency is not improved because more workers are hired to compete 
for promotions. A proportional tax contributes to increase welfare when such taxation contributes to 
increase the tax wedge between career and non-career workers. The welfare is unaffected when this 
tax wedge is unaffected by proportional taxation. A maximum hour law contributes to lower effort per 
worker. The subsequent welfare gain is however exactly neutralized when the tax burden on career 
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workers equals the tax burden on non-career workers as firms respond by hiring more career workers 
working inefficiently long hours.  
 
The model framework is presented in Section 2. Policy is analysed and evaluated in Section 3. Section 
4 concludes.       
2. The model framework  
The model framework is constructed by modifying existing model frameworks and implementing 
these into the present framework. The model framework in this study is constructed to analyse effects 
of government policy on two aspects of distortions connected to rivalry for promotions. The first 
aspect concerns the amount of effort each career worker employs to obtain a promotion, and the 
second aspect concerns the number of workers competing for promotions. The model framework 
assumes that there are two types of firms. The non-career type of firm observes the effort of each 
worker, or the output of each worker which is perfectly correlated with effort. Firms where 
salespeople are paid according to their easily observable output constitute an example. In contrast, the 
career-type firm is unable to observe each worker’s effort without substantial monitoring costs. A 
business organization where managers/ trainees compete to become chief executives is a typical 
example of a career firm. It is difficult to determine each person’s effort or productivity based on his 
effect on the profitability of the whole enterprise. The career firm is, however, able to preserve 
incentives for effort and avoid substantial monitoring costs by designing a contest where career 
workers compete for promotions. The effort of career workers is determined by the Nash equilibrium 
in a non-cooperative game where own effort relative to others’ effort increases the probability of being 
promoted. This reward structure is designed as a promotion rat race where effort triggers effort, which 
triggers more effort etc. The most successful and productive worker in this promotion game is 
promoted. Effort, which is unobservable to firms, is indirectly rewarded when the output of workers is 
positively correlated with effort. The promotion game is simplified compared to the game in Lazear 
and Rosen (1981), where the effort per worker is determined in a Nash equilibrium where the worker 
with the highest output is promoted and the output per worker is determined by effort and luck. Yet 
the key features of the promotion game in the present study are similar to the key features of the game 
in Lazear and Rosen. The described features of the career firm are also consistent with the wage 
contracts offered by firms in Malcomson (1984), who finds that contracts with payment based on 
ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric 
information that prevents payment based on individual performance. Assuming internal promotions 
are consistent with the result derived in Waldman (2003). He studies promotion rules that are 
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concerned both with efficient assignment of workers to tasks and with rewarding performance, and 
finds that internal promotion constitutes a rule that addresses both objectives.  
The features of promotion rat races are likely to differ among firms and contests; see Moldovanu 
(2007). Any formal specification of promotion games is likely to be sensitive to specifications and 
assumptions. The effort of career workers is e.g. likely to approach zero if the abilities of the workers 
differ and both effort and ability are common knowledge among workers. Firms, however, have an 
incentive to organize contests that stimulate the effort of career workers, as this contributes to increase 
profit. The results derived in the present study are based on effort generated by such a contest. The 
model framework is also confined to a single period to avoid sequential and dynamic aspects of 
promotions. The same approach is chosen in Lazear and Rosen (1981). The dynamic aspect may limit 
firms’ ability to implement a fair winner-takes-all game, as losers may exit to an ordinary job. Time 
inconsistency problems connected with promising and actually promoting workers as well as risk 
aversion may also limit firms’ ability to design contracts. These limitations should be considered when 
interpreting the results.   
 
Assume that N  identical and risk-neutral individuals choose between a career job and a non-career 
job. N individuals choose the career job, while NN −  choose the non-career job. All workers supply 
a working time/effort of h, while career workers supply an additional effort of e, which is determined 
in a race for a promotion. The production function of both types of firms is represented by a simple 
fixed unit cost function where one unit of labor generates one unit of a homogenous consumer good.  
The production of career firm i, ix , is given by  
 
(1) )( ehnx ii += . 
 
The production of ordinary firm j, jx , is given by  
(2) hnox jj = , 
 
where in  equals the number of career workers in firm i and jno  equals the number of non-career 
workers in firm j. The number of career firms is fixed at S, while there is free entry of non-career 
firms. The free entry condition together with the fixed unit cost function implies that the wage rate 
equals the price of the consumer good, which is normalized to unity. The aggregate production 
function is found by adding the production of all firms given by equations (1) and (2).  
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(3) ( ) NehNehNhNNX +=++−= )(  
 
Hence, the production is determined by Ne  as N  and h are given.  
2.1. Individuals 
Individuals’ expected utility is given by  
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Expected utility, jU , equals the utility from consumption of worker j when the rewards of the 
promotion game are excluded, jc , plus utility from leisure, jehT −− , plus the probability of being 
promoted, 
i
j
Q
e
, multiplied by the utility of the rewards of being promoted, ii FR + , minus the 
probability of not being promoted, 
i
j
Q
e
−1 , multiplied by the loss of utility of not being promoted, 
( )1−ii n
Fγ .      
   

=
=
in
j
ji eQ
1
, i.e. the sum of additional effort of career workers in firm i.  
iR equals the non-pecuniary value of the position within firm i. 
iF equals the gain of a fair winner-takes-all game introduced by firm i.  
1−i
i
n
F
 equals the loss of a fair winner-takes-all game introduced by firm i. The loss is found by 
dividing the reward of the game by the number of losers, )1( −in . The expected payment offered by 
the fair winner-takes-all game equals zero as losers finance the prize of the winner. These rewards and 
losses can be awarded to workers as differences in wages of promoted and non-promoted workers and 
as bonuses.        
in  equals the number of workers in firm i.  
jc  equals the consumption of worker j when the rewards of the game are excluded.  
T equals total time.  
γ and μ  are parameters in the utility function.  
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The parameters in the utility function are chosen so that one additional unit of effort generates a social 
loss of unity. This assumption is incorporated to be able to study how public policy should be designed 
to combat excess effort of career workers. A social loss due to excess effort is therefore chosen as a 
point of departure in the present study. Hence, parameters in the utility function are chosen so 
that 1+= γμ . One additional unit of effort that generates one additional unit of the consumer good 
generates a loss of utility of unity.  
 
The utility of workers in non-career jobs is found by setting ii FR ,  and je  equal to zero.  
The budget net of the rewards of the game for worker j is given by  
(5) jredj thc −+= π ,  
where jt  equals net tax paid by worker j, where ocj ,=  for career and non-career workers 
respectively. All workers are assumed to own equal shares of all career firms. Hence, the profit 
distributed to each worker, redπ , equals   
(6) 
N
S
i
i
red

=
=
1
π
π ,  
where iπ  equals profit earned by career firm i. The budgets of career workers and non-career workers 
when rewards of the game are excluded only differ with respect to the tax paid by each worker. Hence, 
career workers receive the same fixed wage as non-career workers, and do not receive additional 
payment for their additional supply of effort.   
 
Individuals who choose a career job participate in a contest to obtain desirable positions. The effort 
supplied by career workers is determined by a Nash equilibrium solution in a simple rent-seeking 
game. Individuals maximize expected utility, jU , with respect to excess effort, je . The maximization 
problem of each of the in  individuals working in a career firm becomes  
(7) je UMaxj
,  
where jU  is given by equation (4).  
 The first-order condition of this problem becomes   
(8) 0
1
)(
2 =
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
−
++
−
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ii
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ji
n
FFR
Q
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All career workers face the same problem. Hence, effort becomes identical for each career worker, 
ee j = for all j. This implies that ii enQ = . Implementing these solutions into the first-order condition 
implies that effort is given by 
 
(9) 
( )
( )



−
++
−
=
1
1
2
i
i
ii
i
i
n
FFR
n
ne γ
μ
. 
Effort increases with the rewards of winning the contest, iR  and iF , and effort decreases when the 
number of contestants increases.  
 
Individuals also choose between a career job and a non-career job. A market solution where the work 
force is split between these types of jobs implies that  
(10) oc UU = ,  
i.e. that both types of jobs yield the same ex-ante expected utility.  
2.2. Firms  
The profit of career firm i is given by  
(11) iii hnx −=π . 
Implementing equation (1) into equation (11) gives 
(12) enhnehn iiii =−+= )(π .  
 
The profit of non-career firm i is given by  
(13) iii hnx −=π . 
Implementing equation (2) into equation (13) gives  
(14) 0=−= iii hnohnoπ .  
 
Note that firms do not pay for the additional effort supplied by career workers to obtain a promotion. 
The expected payment of the fair winner-takes-all game equals zero as losers finance the prize of the 
winner.    
 
A fixed number of career firms design profit-maximizing contracts by adjusting the number of career 
workers and by stimulating the effort of career workers by increasing the prize of a fair winner-takes-
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all game.1 The model framework assumes that promotions are accompanied by a non-pecuniary 
reward. Strong empirical evidence supports the view that promotions to a position include a non-
pecuniary reward; see Brown et al. (2008) and Kosteas (2011).2 Each firm, however, is forced to offer 
contracts that imply that the expected utility of career workers equals the utility of non-career workers. 
Monitoring costs are not included in the model framework. However, contracts are constrained to 
preserve the competition for promotions. The firm is constrained to set the prize of the fair winner-
takes-all game and the number of career workers. Assuming a fixed wage rate equal to the wage rate 
offered to non-career workers prevents career firms from selling desirable positions by lowering the 
wage rate of career workers. Selling the position by lowering the wage rate would remove incentives 
for effort to obtain a promotion, and hence generate a need to monitor workers. The number of career 
workers is constrained to be larger than a minimum to prevent that the competition is cancelled. A 
cancelled competition is likely to generate a need to monitor workers. These assumptions also 
contribute to simplify the calculations. The career firm’s problem is given by  
(15) iFn ii
Maxπ
,
 
given equation (10), (i.e. oc UU = , where the net budget constraint given by equation (4) and 
ii enQ =  is implemented,   
and effort given by equation (9), 
and 2≥in . 
 
This problem can be simplified. The condition given by equations (10) and (4) gives    
(16)  
11
)()(
−
−
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

−
+++−−+−+=
i
i
i
i
ii
i
credc n
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n
FFR
n
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              oored UhTth =−+−+= )()( μπγ . 
Equation (16) is simplified to  
(17) )( oc
i
i tt
n
Re −=+− γγμ .   
Inserting equation (9) into equation (17) gives  
                                                     
1 A wage gap between the winner and the losers is also implemented to adjust the effort in the framework of Lazear and 
Rosen (1981).  
2 There are also substantial disadvantages connected to positions at the bottom of the hierarchies. Hierarchical positions affect 
people’s life expectancy (Marmot et al., 1978) and health (Marmot et al., 1991; Marmot, 2004). It has been shown that 
interaction with a superior produces less momentary happiness than any other normal form of social contact; see Layard 
(2005a). There is also evidence indicating a genetic disposition to compete for positions in a hierarchy; see Brammer et al. 
(1994) and McGuire et al. (1993). 
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(18) 
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Inserting equation (18) and equation (9) into equation (12) gives  
(19) 
μ
γγ
π iociii
nttRen )( −−== . 
A fixed number of career firms together with non-pecuniary rewards attached to promotions softens 
the competition among career firms. Firms’ endowment of positions with non-pecuniary rewards is 
transformed into excess effort that does not require pecuniary compensation. Hence, this excess effort 
generates profit as well as inefficiencies. The assumption of a fixed number of career firms can be 
justified when non-pecuniary gains are attached to promotions within incumbent firms only. The 
model framework would have to be modified if non-pecuniary gains were attached to promotions 
within newly entered career firms. Lazear and Rosen (1981), in contrast, assume that competition 
together with free entry force firms to offer contracts that generate the socially efficient outcome of 
effort.   
 
The maximization problem of the firm illustrated in (15) becomes  
(20) 
( )
μ
γγ ioci
n
nttRMax
i
−−
,  
given that 2≥in .  
The profit equals μ
γ iR  when the tax burden on career workers equals the tax burden on non-career 
workers. The firm is indifferent between combinations of in  and e  that generate this fixed profit. The 
derivative wrt in  equals 
( )
μ
γ oc tt −
− , which is negative when oc tt > . Hence, the solution implies 
that 2=in  when oc tt > . The difference in tax burden tightens the no-arbitrage condition as each 
additional career worker implies an additional tax burden of oc tt − . This reduces firms ability to 
extract profit by increasing the number of career workers. The firm is able to extract more profit by 
stimulating the effort of the two remaining workers compared to increasing the number of workers. 
It follows from equation (12) that 
i
i
n
e π= . Inserting equation (19) into this expression gives the 
market solution for effort of each career worker: 
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(21) 
μ
γγ )(
2 oc
i ttR
e
−−
= .  
 
The total demand for career workers, N, becomes 
(22) SSnnN i
S
i
i 2
1
===
=
. 
 
The total non-pecuniary value of positions equals  
(23) SRRR i
S
i
i == 
=1
. 
Note that R is determined by exogenous parameters. Hence, the promotion game does not affect the 
non-pecuniary reward of the game.   
2.3. The government  
The government is assumed to maximize an ex-ante individualistic welfare function, W. The  
oc UU =  constraint in the market solution implies that all individuals are rewarded with the same ex-
ante utility. Hence, the government is not concerned with ex-ante redistribution issues within this 
model framework. The welfare function is given by   
(24) oc UNNNUW )( −+= . 
Inserting equations (4) and (5) and ii enQ =  into equation (24) gives  
(25) ( ) ( ) 
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
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Inserting equations (6), (12), (22) and (23) into equation (25) gives   
(26)  ( )( ) RNetNtNtNhThNW koo γγγγμγ +−−+−−+= . 
 
The fixed level of government spending, G, equals the net tax revenue generated by the taxes 
implemented. Hence,  
(27) ( ) co NttNNG +−= .  
Implementing equation (27) into equation (26) gives  
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(28) ( )( ) GRNehThNW γγμγ −+−−+= .  
 
Hence, the only variable that can be affected by policy is the term Ne− . All other variables are 
exogenous and fixed. It is difficult to determine the net welfare effect of an increase in the number of 
career firms based on existing empirical evidence. Assuming a fixed number of career firms prevents 
questionable welfare gains connected to an increase in the number of positions with a non-pecuniary 
reward.3 The fixed number of positions with a fixed non-pecuniary value constitutes a “fixed cake” 
from a social planner’s point of view. This simplifies the calculations as effort by career workers to 
acquire such positions constitutes pure waste from a social planner’s point of view4. The government’s 
objective is consistent with the objective of minimizing the social loss defined as the maximum 
attainable welfare minus the achieved welfare, W, where the maximum attainable welfare is found by 
setting 0=Ne . Note that the sum of career firms’ profits also equals Ne . Hence, firms objective of 
maximizing profits implies that the welfare is minimized and that the social loss is maximized. The 
invisible hand of Adam Smith generates distortions rather than efficiency within the present model 
framework.    
2.4. Equilibrium   
Aggregate consumption is found by adding the consumption of all agents in the economy. Hence, 
aggregate consumption is given by  
(29) ( ) ( )( ) GthNNthNC oredcred +−+−+−+= ππ . 
Implementing equation (6), (12), (22) and (27) into equation (29) gives 
(30) NehNC += . 
Hence, aggregate consumption equals the aggregate production given by equation (3).  
                                                     
3 Non-pecuniary welfare losses connected to an increase in the number of workers at the bottom of the hierarchy are not 
incorporated into the model framework.   
4 Distortions in the supply of labour due to this type of effort are added to distortions due to a desire to consume more than 
others and to unforeseen habit formation; see Layard, 2005b. 
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3. Policy analyses   
The policy tools available are rather limited, as the government is unable to observe different motives 
for effort. Hence, the government is unable to observe to what extent workers can be labelled career 
workers or non-career workers. Appropriate adjustments in the design of the income tax system 
represent a way for the government to differentiate the taxation of career workers and non-career 
workers. In fact, career workers who earn more than ordinary workers pay more taxes within both a 
proportional and a progressive income tax system. Implementing a larger tax wedge between career 
workers and ordinary workers, however, is likely to generate distortions that are not incorporated into 
the current model framework. Yet conducting a trade-off between such distortions and distortions 
connected to rivalry for promotions is beyond the scope of this study, which is confined to policy 
implications generated by rivalry for promotions. The results derived within the current model 
framework should be interpreted within this context.    
3.1. A proportional income tax 
Assume that the government implements a proportional tax on income or consumption and that the tax 
burden of other types of taxes is equal for career workers and non-career workers, i.e. oc tt = . The 
government budget constraint is preserved by adjusting other taxes or via government transfers. The 
proportional income tax reduces the expected gains and losses of the promotion game by the same 
factor. The no-arbitrage equation, (16), is however unaffected by proportional taxation as the expected 
income for career workers equals the income for non-career workers. Hence, firms are able to extract 
the same amount of effort by increasing the reward of the promotion game or by increasing the 
number of career workers. The no-arbitrage equation, (16), implies that profit, eni , is determined by 
exogenous parameters. The discussion in Section 2.3 demonstrates that the sum of career firms’ profits 
equals the total social loss, which determines the ex-ante welfare. Hence, the ex-ante welfare is 
determined by exogenous parameters that are unaffected by a proportional tax. The ex-post 
distribution of outcomes is not determined when oc tt = . Hence, the model framework does not 
predict effects of proportional taxation on the distribution of ex-post outcomes in this case.  
 
Empirical observations, however, suggest that the expected income of a career worker exceeds the 
expected income of a non-career worker. This empirical feature is excluded from the model 
framework to preserve a simple yet tractable framework. Introducing a proportional income tax with 
such a difference in expected income implies that the tax burden of career workers increases compared 
to non-career workers. The effect of increasing the tax burden on career workers compared to non-
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career workers is analysed by introducing/increasing the tax on career workers relative to non-career 
workers.5 Inserting equation (22) into equation (28) gives   
(31) ( )( ) GRSehThNW γγμγ −+−−+= 2 . 
Hence, a policy that lowers the effort of career workers contributes to increase welfare. The market 
solution for e  is given by equation (21). It follows from this equation that an increase in ct , and a 
reduction in ot  to preserve the budget constraint, imply a reduction in e . Hence, the welfare increases 
as a result of such a tax change. Note that an increase in the tax wedge increases the incentive for 
firms to reduce the number of career workers. Such a reduction would contribute to increase the 
remaining career workers’ effort to be promoted, as their chances of being promoted improve. The 
number of career workers, however, is already set equal to the minimum constraint in the market 
solution; see the solution of the problem in equation (20). The tax incentive, however, forces firms to 
reduce the wage premium for workers who are promoted. The effort of career workers is subsequently 
reduced to a level that restores the market equilibrium where career and non-career workers are 
equally well off. Equation (18) and the market solution of in  imply that 
(32) ( )ocii ttRF −−= 22 . 
 
Equation (32) implies that iF  is falling when )( oc tt −  is increasing. This contributes to reduce the 
inequality in ex-post utility outcomes. Hence, the government is able to improve efficiency and the 
distribution of ex-post utility by increasing the tax wedge between career jobs and non-career jobs. 
This conclusion contradicts the conclusion in Persson and Sandmo (2005) and Meyer and Mookherjee 
(1987), where there is a conflict between efficiency and equity in ex-post outcomes. The difference in 
conclusions emerges because taxation lowers effort below the socially optimal level within the two 
quoted papers, while in the present study effort is lowered from a level above the socially desirable 
level.   
 
The government is able to remove all distortions by implementing tax rates such that 2
i
oc
Rtt =− . 
Equation (21) shows that such rewards generate zero effort to obtain a promotion. The net loss of 
choosing a career job versus a non-career job generated by this tax reform exactly equals the expected 
non-pecuniary gain of obtaining a promotion. Hence, firms are not able to exploit career workers by 
                                                     
5 The tax wedge between career workers and non-career workers may also increase when tuition subsidies linked to career 
jobs are reduced. 
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stimulating effort as this would lower the utility of career workers below that of non-career workers. 
These tax rates implemented into equation (32) imply that 2
i
i
RF −= . Hence, the expected gain of 
obtaining a promotion equals zero as the non-pecuniary reward is exactly neutralized by a negative 
wage premium. Note that iF  is positive when ( )oci ttR −> 22 . This means that firms have added a 
pecuniary reward to the non-pecuniary reward connected to a promotion, which contributes to increase 
career workers effort to obtain a promotion. Hence, the social loss generated by the market solution 
exceeds the social loss connected to rivalry for the non-pecuniary rewards only. A negative value of 
iF  is feasible within the model framework. Such a wage spread, however, does not seem to be 
consistent with empirical observations of wage spreads.      
 
Assume that the government implements a proportional tax on income or consumption and that other 
types of taxes such as tuition subsidies imply that career workers are taxed heavier than non-career 
workers, oc tt > . A proportional tax on income or consumption contributes to reduce the rewards of 
the promotion game, which in turn contributes to reduce the effort of career workers. A proportional 
income tax, however, does not alter the no-arbitrage condition, oc UU = . This can be illustrated by 
multiplying the income components of equation (16) with ( )propt−1 , where propt  equals the 
proportional income tax rate. Hence, the constraint of the firm’s maximization problem remains 
unchanged. The solution of the firm’s maximization problem implies that 2=in  when oc tt > . The 
effort of career workers is obtained by dividing the profit by the number of career workers. The 
rewards of the promotion game, however, are increased so that the incentive for effort is unchanged. 
Hence, the effort solution is unaffected by the proportional tax.  
3.3. A tax on top income 
Assume that the government implements a tax rate on top income, topt , which only affects the winner 
of the promotion game. Such a tax would of course also affect workers career decisions and the effort 
to be promoted. The effort given by equation (9) is changed to       
(33) 
( )
( )



−
+−+
−
=
1
1
2
i
i
topiii
i
i
n
FtFFR
n
ne γ
μ
. 
The constraint that says that the ex-ante utilities of career workers and non-career workers are 
identical in equation (17) is changed to  
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(34) )(
)(
oc
i
itopi tt
n
FtR
e −=
−
+− γ
γ
μ .   
The maximization problem of the firm given by (15) can be written as  
(35) enMax iFn ii ,
, 
given that  
( )
( )



−
+−+
−
=
1
1
2
i
i
topiii
i
i
n
FtFFR
n
ne γ
μ
, 
)(
)(
oc
i
itopi tt
n
FtR
e −=
−
+− γ
γ
μ  and 
2≥in . 
This problem can be simplified by manipulating the constraint given by equation (34), and inserting 
this equation into the objective function and the constraint given by equation (33). The remaining 
constraint of the problem becomes  
(36) 
topi
ioci
i tn
nttRF
+
−−
=
2)(
. 
Implementing this constraint into the maximization problem gives 
 (37) 
( )
μ
γ
μ
γ
ioctopi
ioci
topi
n
ntttn
nttRtR
Max
i
−
−








+
−−
−
2)(
 
 
First, consider the case where oc tt =  and 0=topt . The profit given by the maximization problem in 
equation (37) equals μ
γ iR , and is hence determined by exogenous variables. Second, consider the 
case where oc tt = and  0>topt . 
The derivative of (37) with respect to in  becomes 
(38)  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
μ
γ
μ
γπ oc
topi
iocitopiioctop
i
tt
tn
nttRtnnttt
n
−
−



+
−−−+−−
−=
∂
∂
2
22
. 
Implementing oc tt = into equation (38) gives  
(39)  ( ) 02 >+=∂
∂
topi
itop
i tn
Rt
n μ
γπ
. 
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Thus, the profit is increasing in in  when 0>topt . The constraint given by equation (36) implies that 
iF  is approaching zero when in  is approaching infinite. The profit of career firms is approaching  
μ
γ iR , which is identical to the profit when 0=topt . Hence, firms completely avoid the tax burden of 
the top tax in this case. The social loss, which consists of the sum of profits from career firms, is 
approaching 
μ
γ iRS . This expression for the social loss is determined by exogenous variables only. 
Hence, the ex-ante welfare is unaffected by a marginal change in the top tax rate.  
 
Consider the case where oc tt >  and topt  is marginal. It follows from equation (38) that profit is 
decreasing in in . Hence, firms choose to hire the minimum number of career workers, 2=in . It 
follows from equation (36) that the reward of the promotion game, iF , is reduced when topt  is 
introduced/increased. It follows from equation (33) that effort, e , is reduced when iF  is reduced, 
Hence, profit, eni , is reduced by a marginal increase in the tax on top income in this case. This 
implies that the welfare is increased by a tax on top income in this case because the social loss equals 
the sum of the profits of career firms. The top tax rate could be increased to a level where firms decide 
to increase the number of career workers. This strategy, however, triggers taxation as the tax burden 
on career workers exceeds the tax burden on non-career workers.   
   
These results show that firms change the conditions of the promotion game according to the tax 
system. A tax on the reward of the promotion game in combination with no additional tax wedge 
between career workers and non-career workers leads to a game with no pecuniary rewards, but with 
many contestants. The ex-ante welfare is unchanged when the tax on the reward is introduced, even 
though excess effort per career worker is reduced. The reason is that more workers employ excess 
effort to be promoted. The inequality in ex-post outcomes is reduced as the rewards of the promotion 
game is reduced. More workers, however, face unequal outcomes as the number of career workers 
increases.  
 
A tax system with a tax wedge between career workers and non-career workers, and no tax on the 
rewards of the promotion game, leads to a game with a big reward and few contestants. An increase in 
the tax wedge between career workers and non-career workers contributes to lower the rewards of the 
promotion game. The ex-ante welfare is increased as excess effort per worker is reduced while the 
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number of career workers remains unchanged. Inequality in ex-post outcomes is reduced as the 
rewards of the promotion game is reduced. 
3.4. Laws and regulations  
The government may, however, restrict excess labour effort by imposing laws and regulations that 
restrict each worker’s labour supply. Assume that the government implements a restriction on excess 
effort in a given market solution. This changes the maximization problem of firms, as they are no 
longer able to manipulate the solution of effort by adjusting the prize of the fair game or the number of 
competing career workers. Hence, profit equals  
enii =π , where e  is fixed for the firm.  
Profit-maximizing firms would like to increase the number of career workers. The increase, however, 
is restricted by the condition oc UU = . The reduction in effort contributes to increase the welfare, but 
the increase in the number of career workers contributes to reduce the welfare. The net welfare effect 
is found by implementing the solution for in  given by the condition oc UU =  into the expression for 
the welfare. Equation (17) implies that  
(40) ( ) ett
Rn
oc
i
i μγ
γ
+−
= . 
 
Inserting equations (22) and (33) into equation (28) gives  
(41) ( )( ) ( ) GReett
RShThNW
oc
i γγ
μγ
γμγ −+



+−
−−+= . 
 
The welfare effect of a marginal change in effort is found by taking the derivative of (41) with respect 
to e. 
(42) 
( )
( )( ) 02
2
<
+−
−−
=
∂
∂
ett
ttRS
e
W
oc
oci
μγ
γ
 when oc tt > .  
 
The welfare is unaffected by the maximum hour law when the tax burden on career workers equals the 
tax burden on non-career workers. A reduction of effort by imposing laws and regulations leads to an 
increase in welfare for a given set of differentiated tax rates. The government is able to remove the 
entire social loss within the model framework by restricting effort to zero. This case implies that 
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( )
i
i
oc n
Rtt γγ =− . Hence, the net taxation of career workers compared to non-career workers equals 
the expected non-pecuniary gain of obtaining a promotion.  
 
It follows from the expression of the derivative of the welfare function with respect to e that the 
increase in welfare generated by a reduction in e is positively correlated with the tax wedge between 
career workers and non-career workers. It follows from equation (40), where the restriction on effort is 
binding, that in  is reduced when the tax difference, ( )oc tt − , is increased. This contributes to increase 
the welfare since a reduction in in  contributes to increase the welfare. Hence, the welfare gain of 
restricting effort increases when restrictions on effort are combined with an increase in the tax 
difference, ( )oc tt − .  
 
Implementing laws and regulations to reduce the effort of career workers is likely to generate other 
distortions not incorporated into the model framework used in this study. A welfare-maximizing 
government has to balance the welfare losses generated by such distortions against the welfare gain 
found in this study. Conducting such a trade-off is beyond the scope of this study. This section of the 
study is confined to evaluate whether imposing laws and regulations that restrict the effort of career 
workers contributes to reduce distortions connected to rivalry for promotions.   
3.5. The labour/ leisure choice 
The objective of this study is to analyse public policy to combat excess effort of career workers. The 
traditional policy recommendation would be to adjust the income tax to neutralize the distortion. The 
problem with this policy recommendation is first of all that the income tax does not differentiate 
between career and non-career workers. Hence, an income tax adjustment would distort the 
labour/leisure choice of non-career workers. The second problem is that very little is known about how 
income taxation affects the promotion game and, hence, the excess effort. The objective of this study 
is to illuminate this issue.   
 
One may argue that this study excludes several important aspects of distortions in the labour/leisure 
choice. Both direct and indirect taxes reduce the rewards of working. Such taxation contributes to 
distort the labour/leisure choice, as workers respond by working less. Hence, these taxes contribute to 
neutralize or even reverse the excess effort of career workers studied within the current model 
framework. Layard, however, argues that individuals’ desire to consume more than others (see e.g. 
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Carlson et al., 2007) and a failure to foresee expensive habits distort the labour/leisure choice, as these 
factors make workers work too much from a social planner’s point of view. Layard (2005b) also 
argues that such distortions in the supply of labour are exactly cancelled out by distortions due to the 
tax rates implemented in many industrialized countries. Hence, the excess effort of career workers 
studied within the current model framework is not removed or neutralized when Layard’s arguments 
hold. There is an ongoing debate on whether public policy should respond to positional externalities; 
see Frank (2008).  
3.6. Other incentive schemes  
The fair winner-takes-all game was constructed by adjusting the wage paid to winners and losers of 
the promotion game. Firms, however, may construct identical games with alternative forms of 
payment. The wage prize could be replaced with the right to transfer unattractive work assignments, 
i.e. where the winner transfers unattractive work assignments to the losers. Another alternative would 
be to allow the winner to transfer a pressure to work long hours to the losers. Both these alternative 
forms of payments would generate an incentive to increase the effort to win the promotion game. The 
effect on expected utility would be identical to the effects generated by the wage game when expected 
gains and losses are identical to the ones in the wage game. The profit of firms is determined by the 
total effort of labour. Profit is unaffected when the effort of one worker is transferred to another 
worker. Hence, the effect on expected profit would also be identical to the effect generated by the 
wage game.  
 
Firms may also boost effort by implementing games where the reward is divided among most 
contestants, and where few suffer a loss. This strategy can be implemented to preserve incentives for 
effort when a tax on top income is introduced. Hence, in this case the tax on top income becomes 
inefficient because it is avoided via changes in firms’ reward systems. A strategy to inflict losses upon 
losers may spread down to the bottom of a hierarchy. Low-ability workers may exit the labour market 
and enter welfare benefit systems. Hence, the cost of such a strategy is partly transferred to the 
government in this case. Firms may also issue a bonus to a group of workers to trigger monitoring 
among workers. Group interaction effects similar to those in athletics may even diminish the 
discomfort of working long hours. This strategy is, however, also likely to harm a minority of the 
workers.     
23 
4. Conclusion  
This study investigates whether excess effort to climb a career ladder justifies policy interventions. 
The study shows that both a tax on top income aimed at lowering the rewards of a promotion and a 
maximum hour law that restricts excess effort increase welfare when the tax burden on career workers 
exceeds the tax burden on non-career workers. The inequality in ex-post outcomes is also reduced by 
the tax policy. Taxation and/or a maximum hour law do not improve welfare when the tax burden on 
career workers equals the tax burden on non-career workers. The welfare does not improve because 
the welfare gain of reducing excess effort per worker is neutralized by the welfare cost connected to an 
increase in the number of career workers. A proportional tax contributes to increase welfare when such 
taxation contributes to increase the tax wedge between career and non-career workers. The welfare is 
unaffected when this tax wedge is unaffected by proportional taxation.  
 
One may question whether these model predictions are consistent with empirical observations of tax 
rates and management payment schemes. Long-term trends show that the compensation to managers 
increases as the tax rate on labour income declines; see Frydman and Molloy (2011). Short-run 
dynamics, however, unveil that changes in tax rates have a marginal effect on executive compensation. 
They also suggest that slow-moving social norms may have favoured higher compensation and lower 
tax rates. It is difficult to conclude on this issue as many factors are likely to influence the design of 
the tax system and management payment schemes.      
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